Department of Economics
Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, 2013 (expected)
MA, Economics, Northwestern University, 2009
BA, Mathematics, Northwestern University, 2006.
Fields of Specialization
Macroeconomics, Political Economy
Job Market Paper:
"Commitment versus Discretion in a Political Economy Model of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interaction"
Price commitment results in lower welfare. I explore the consequences of price commitment by pairing an independent monetary authority issuing nominal bonds with a fiscal authority whose decisions are microfounded by a political economy model. Without price commitment, nominal bonds are backed by a new endogenous form of commitment and can be used for tax smoothing. With price commitment, nominal bonds can be used for tax smoothing and wasteful spending. Price commitment eliminates monetary control over fiscal decisions. The results show that the combination of a politically distorted fiscal authority and an independent monetary authority with nominal bonds and without price commitment is the solution to a constrained mechanism design problem that overcomes time inconsistency and results in the highest welfare.
Prof. Matthias Doepke (Committee Chair)
Prof. Martin Eichenbaum
Prof. Mirko Wiederholt